



**INTEGRITY AND CONTINUITY ANALYSIS FROM  
GPS**

**JULY TO SEPTEMBER 2017**

**QUARTERLY REPORT**

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# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Purpose of Document

This document presents the results of the integrity and continuity analysis for GPS against ICAO requirements for the period of 1 July 2017 to 30 September 2017. The objectives of the integrity and continuity analysis are to compare the measured performance to applicable ICAO SARPs in Annex 10 Volume 1 [RD.1], covering the following parameters [AD.1]:

- Accuracy;
- Integrity;
- Continuity;
- Availability.

Assuming fault free receiver performance conforming to TSO-C129 specification. The performance is analysed according to [AD.1] and [AD.2] using raw data recorded at the OSi site MLGR.

## 1.2 Document Overview

This document is arranged in the following sections:

- **Section 1**, the current section, is an introduction which describes the purpose, scope and structure of the document;
- **Section 2** gives an introduction to the activity, including relevant performance requirements, methodology for assessment and list of assumptions;
- **Section 3** presents the accuracy assessment;
- **Section 4** contains an assessment of the integrity;
- **Section 5** presents the continuity assessment;
- **Section 6** contains an assessment of the availability;
- **Section 7** presents the conclusions.

## 1.3 References

### 1.3.1 Applicable Documents

Ref.	Document title	Document reference	Issue	Date
AD.1	Purchase order – GPS Performance Monitoring Service for 2017 Q1	PO 201700216	-	-
AD.2	Outline Proposal to Ordnance Survey Ireland (OSi) in response to Request For Quotation for the provision of GPS performance monitoring services for Irish Aviation Authority (IAA)	OSI-GMAS-PRP	1.0	06/03/14

Table 1-1: Applicable Documents

### 1.3.2 Reference Documents

Ref.	Document title	Document reference	Issue	Date
RD.1	ICAO SARPS, Annex 10: International Standards and Recommended Practices: Aeronautical Telecommunications, Volume 1: Radio Navigation Aids	-	6 <sup>th</sup> Edition	July 2006
RD.2	Global Positioning System Standard Positioning Service Performance Standard	GPS SPS	4 <sup>th</sup> Edition	Sept 2008
RD.3	Reference Set of Parameters for RAIM Availability Simulations', EUROCAE WG-62	-	-	8-9 July 2003
RD.4	The International GNSS Service in a changing landscape of Global Navigation Satellite Systems	Journal of Geodesy 83: 191-198		2009

Table 1-2: Reference Documents

## 1.4 Acronyms

Acronym	Organisation
AOD	Age Of Data
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
GPS	Global Positioning System
HDOP	Horizontal Dilution Of Precision
IAA	Irish Aviation Authority
IGS	International GNSS Service
NANU	Notice Advisory to Navstar Users
NOTAM	Notice To Airmen
NSL	Nottingham Scientific Ltd
OSi	Ordnance Survey Ireland
PDOP	Position Dilution Of Precision
RAIM	Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
SIS	Signal In Space
SPS	Standard Positioning Service
TTA	Time To Alarm
UERE	User Equivalent Range Error
URA	User Range Accuracy
URE	User Range Error
VDOP	Vertical Dilution Of Precision

Table 1-3 : Acronyms and Abbreviations



## 2 INTRODUCTION

### 2.1 Purpose

The purpose of the performance monitoring activity [AD.1] is to collect and analyse data on the performance of the GPS Signal In Space (SiS). For this report, the applicable requirements are defined in the ICAO SARPs (Standards and Recommended Practices) contained in Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Volume 1 Radio Navigation Aids [RD.1].

### 2.2 ICAO Standards and Definitions

The ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1 Chapter 3 Section 3.7 details the ICAO SARPs for GNSS [RD.1]. Section 3.7.2.4.1 sets the Signal-in-Space (SiS) performance requirements. An important assumption made in this respect is that “*the combination of GNSS elements and a fault-free receiver shall meet the SiS requirements defined in Table 3.7.2.4- 1 (located at the end of section 3.7)*”. The table below presents the requirements specified for NPA together with a number of corresponding notes.

Horizontal Accuracy 95% (Notes 1 and 3)	Horizontal Alert Limit	Integrity	Time to Alert (Note 3)	Continuity (Note 4)	Availability (Note 5)
220m	556m	1-1x10 <sup>-7</sup> /h	10 s	1-1x10 <sup>-4</sup> /h to 1-1x10 <sup>-8</sup> /h	0.99 to 0.99999

**Note 1** – The 95<sup>th</sup> percentile values for GNSS position errors are those required for the intended operation at the lowest height above threshold (HAT), if applicable.

**Note 3** – The accuracy and time-to-alert requirements include the nominal performance of a fault free receiver.

**Note 4** – Ranges of values are given for the continuity requirement for NPA operations, as this requirement is dependent upon several factors including the intended operation, traffic density, complexity of airspace and availability of alternative navigational aids. The lower value given is the minimum requirement for areas with low traffic density and airspace complexity.

**Note 5** – A range of values is given for the availability requirement as these requirements are dependent upon the operational need which is based upon several factors including the frequency of operations, weather environments, the size and duration of outages, availability of alternative navigational aids, radar coverage, traffic density and reversionary operational procedures. The lower values given are the minimum availabilities for which a system is considered to be practical but are not adequate to replace non-GNSS navigation aids. For approach and departure, the higher values given are based upon the availability requirements at airports with a large amount of traffic assuming that operations to or from multiple runways are affected but reversionary operational procedures ensure the safety of the operation.

Some related definitions for the performance requirements are given below.

### **Horizontal Accuracy**

Annex 10 Volume 1 Attachment D section 3.2.1 states: *“GNSS position error is the difference between the estimated position and the actual position. For an estimated position at a specific location, the probability should be at least 95 per cent that the position error is within the accuracy requirement.”*

### **Integrity, Horizontal Alert Limit, Time to Alert**

ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1 Attachment D section 3.3.1 states: *“Integrity is a measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the information supplied by the total system. Integrity includes the ability of a system to provide timely and valid warnings to the user (alerts) when the system must not be used for the intended operation (or phase of flight).”* Therefore, integrity is the probability of not using a radiated false guidance signal.

For a loss of integrity to occur, the following conditions need to exist at the same time:

- radiation from the satellite system of a signal, which would result in a derived position error outside the ICAO GNSS NPA Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL), and
- failure to detect and indicate when the ICAO GNSS NPA HALs have been exceeded for a period of time beyond the ICAO GNSS NPA Time-To-Alert (TTA) period.

In this respect, the following points are relevant:

- The GPS SPS [RD.2] incorporates monitoring of the health of the satellites. This monitoring is not at the required probability level nor is it sufficiently prompt to fulfil the ICAO GNSS Horizontal Accuracy and TTA requirements.
- The use of at least a TSO-C129a compliant receiver will be necessary for GPS supported NPAs in accordance with AMC-20-XX. This type of receiver provides “Real-time monitoring” of the derived GPS position by the use of Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM).
- The requirements for the integrity contribution of the receiver are specified in document RTCA DO-208 Table 2-1 “GPS Position Integrity Performance Requirements”, which is referenced from document TSO-C129a. Table 2-1 sets a minimum detection probability at 0.999.
- The ICAO requirement for integrity for GPS when used to provide a NPA is  $1-(1 \times 10^{-7})$  per flight hour.
- Taking into account the receiver detection probability of 0.999 there remains an integrity requirement of  $1 - (1 \times 10^{-4})$  per flight hour to be achieved by the remaining parts of the system. These remaining parts include the performance of the SIS and any other real time monitoring devices in use.

### **Continuity**

Annex 10 Attachment D section 3.4.1 states: *“Continuity of service of a system is the capability of the system to perform its function without unscheduled interruptions during the*

*intended operation.*” ICAO provides a range of values for continuity; the value used by a specific aerodrome will depend upon several factors including the intended operation, traffic density, complexity of airspace and availability of alternative navigational aids. Guidance on setting this requirement can be found in Annex 10 Volume 1 Attachment D section 3.4.2.3

It should be noted that the ICAO SARPs for NPA are consistent with those for en-route. In this respect, Annex 10 Volume 1 Attachment D section 3.4.2.1 states: “*For en-route operations, continuity of service relates to the capability of the navigation system to provide a navigation output with the specified accuracy and integrity throughout the intended operation, assuming that it was available at the start of the operation.*”

Therefore, loss of continuity (strictly in the case of SiS, i.e. assuming a fault free receiver) can be considered to be when the horizontal alert limit cannot be achieved due to an unexpected failure of the GPS service for 10 Seconds or more, during a period when RAIM is predicted to be available for a specific approach.

### **Availability**

ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1 Attachment D section 3.5.1 states: “*The availability of GNSS is characterized by the portion of time the system is to be used for navigation during which reliable navigation information is presented to the crew, autopilot, or other system managing the flight of the aircraft*”. Furthermore, Section 3.5.6 states: “*The availability of GNSS should be determined through design, analysis and modelling, rather than measurement.*”

Under normal conditions, availability of the signal from sufficient satellites for the provision of RAIM, a prerequisite for the use of GPS in support of a NPA, is predictable and may be assessed in advance of the use of the instrument approach procedure.

### **2.3 Methodology**

For the performance analysis in this report, raw GPS measurement data from reference stations has been analysed.

The primary source of data is the OSi network of active stations in Ireland. OSi operates a national network of GNSS receiver stations. The network consists of 25 receivers that provide 24 hour availability of dual frequency GPS and GLONASS data. For the purposes of this performance monitoring activity, OSi provides raw data for 2 of these sites to NSL for processing and analysis. The sites that are used are Mullingar (MLGR) and Sligo Hospital (SLGO). The locations of these sites are shown in Figure 2-1.



Figure 2-1: Location of Performance Monitoring Stations

In this report, MLGR is used as the main site to provide performance monitoring across the whole of Irish airspace and SLGO is a back-up in case of problems with MLGR and to allow cross-checking of performance in the case of anomaly investigations. These sites have been chosen to fulfil the following criteria:

- Centrally located within Ireland in order to ensure monitoring of complete airspace;
- Good data availability and continuity (i.e. avoid sites with historically poor data availability);
- Good measurement quality (i.e. avoid sites with known interference, multipath or sky visibility issues);
- Availability of required observation types and data.

During this period there was an upgrade of MLGR site and it has now been renamed MLG1. During the switchover there is a gap of 2 days in the data from MLGR/MLG1 and so on these days (5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> September) data from SLGO is used instead.

In case there are problems with the data access simultaneously from both MLGR and SLGO, data from the EGNOS RIMS station at Cork will be used. The raw observation data is made available through the EGNOS Data Access Server (EDAS) in real-time or via an ftp archive.

## 2.4 Assumptions

For processing the raw data and generating the results the following assumptions are made:

- Single frequency (L1) processing with C/A code;

- 5 degree elevation mask used;
- Broadcast iono model (Klobuchar) used to remove ionospheric errors;
- RTCA trop model used to remove tropospheric errors;
- Weighted least squares RAIM algorithm used for RAIM prediction (protection level computation) and Fault Detection;
- Probability of missed detection = 0.001 and Probability of false alarm =  $1 \times 10^{-5}$  for RAIM computations;
- UERE budget (non-SIS components) used in position solution and for RAIM predictions based given below [RD.3]:

Elevation, degrees	Error, metres
5	7.48
10	6.64
15	5.92
20	5.31
30	4.31
40	3.57
50	3.06
60	2.73
90	2.44

- The URA value from the broadcast navigation message is combined with the values in the table to form the total UERE for the observations.

As the actual monitoring is based on the measurements from one receiver, the following points should be noted:

- Performance monitoring is local to the monitoring station with a coverage area defined by the correlation of the major error sources and the configuration of the constellation.
- The range domain errors contain the residuals of other error sources other than the SIS range errors, hence, the performance statistics generated are conservative.

### 3 ACCURACY

Accuracy is defined as the measure of the calculated position error between the position solution and the known location of the antenna at the 95th percentile. The position solution is computed at the receiver using the L1 GPS measurements at 1Hz rate above an elevation of 5 degrees. The horizontal and vertical error distributions for the period July 1 to September 30 2017 are shown in the following figures for fault-free solutions (i.e. no problems indicated). The samples shown in each figure are in error bins of 1cm and include position errors from all days during the monitoring period.




Figure 3-1: Horizontal Error Distribution for Monitoring Period




Figure 3-2: Vertical Error Distribution for Monitoring Period

The daily 95% position errors are also shown to illustrate that the usual daily performance is also well within the requirement.




Figure 3-3: Horizontal Position Accuracy (95%) for Monitoring Period




Figure 3-4: Vertical Position Accuracy (95%) for Monitoring Period

It is clear from the results that usually the maximum horizontal errors are well below the accuracy requirement for Non Precision Approach (220m, 95%). However, there was one day where in post-processing much larger errors were seen. This was on 12<sup>th</sup> September at 08:51:18 where there were apparent range errors of around 1000m metres on PRN07. At this time there is an active unplanned outage (unscheduled NANU 2017099) and it seems that for most of this period there are no measurements to PRN07 (perhaps it is not

transmitting) but for 12 seconds from 08:51:18 measurements do appear in the observation RINEX file with very large errors (~1km range error). Looking at the navigation messages there is no new message received with an UNHEALTHY status flag for some time after this, and so at the time of these observations there is no indication to the receiver that PRN07 is unhealthy and should not be used. In post-processing this causes position errors of 315m in horizontal and 235m in vertical, which actually exceeds limit for non-precision approach., although overall the accuracy at 95% level is well below this.

The actual impact on receivers that were providing real-time navigation solutions is difficult to say for sure because it will depend on whether the satellite was in view of the receiver for that short period, whether the receiver had a valid navigation message to use for that satellite, and whether or not the receiver applied a RAIM algorithm or other measurement checks to identify and remove faulty satellites. Nevertheless, it is clear there was a potential issue at this time.



## 4 INTEGRITY

The approach taken here is as stated in Section 1.2, with the integrity data generated based on the known positions of the antennas. The basic assumption made is that the receiver is fault free and that its integrity function has a probability of missed detection ( $P_{md}$ ) of 0.001. The process adopted here involves firstly mapping the ICAO requirements to the period under investigation to enable the determination of compliance with ICAO requirements. Given the  $P_{md}$  of 0.001 and that the integrity risk for NPA is specified as  $1 \times 10^{-7}$  per hour, the SiS probability of failure is determined as  $1 \times 10^{-4}$  per hour. Because of the effect of dynamics and/or contextual factors on aircraft attitude, it is assumed that there are 3600 independent measurements in any given hour. This translates to a probability of failure of  $2.78 \times 10^{-8}$  per sample. Therefore, for the period analysed (i.e. 7948800 samples) the maximum allowable number of failures is 0.22.

The next step compares the positioning solutions as determined from the measurements and the known positions of the antenna. The resulting position errors are then compared to the alert limit for NPA. Finally, the number of violations (the cases where the position errors are larger than the alert limit) is compared to the maximum allowable number of failed satellites (i.e. 0.22). It is on this basis that compliance (or non-compliance) with ICAO's integrity requirements has been determined. It should be noted that this is a rather simple approach as it does not account for the uncertainties in the quantities being compared, particularly in the case of position solutions and the coordinates of the antennas. However, as the Alert Limit is large compared to the normal level of positioning error it is a reasonable approximation.

The distributions of horizontal and vertical errors for the period July 1 to September 30 2017 were shown in section 3. It was seen that the horizontal errors were usually around 1-2m although as explained there was one day where in post-processing position errors of 315m were seen due to problem with PRN07. These are still well below the limit of 556m and means that the integrity requirement was met during the monitoring period, although the fact there were potentially such large errors in this period is quite unusual.

## 5 CONTINUITY

The continuity in the monitoring period is computed as:

$$continuity = 1 - \frac{CTI}{MTBF}$$

Where CTI is the continuity time interval (1hr in this case), MTBF is the mean time between failures, which is computed as total time divided by number of failure events.

A failure event is counted as any period lasting for more than 10 seconds where:

- HPL cannot be computed (i.e. <5 satellites in view above elevation mask);
- Computed HPL > Alert Limit (i.e. 556m);
- Computed horizontal position error > Alert Limit;
- Any combination of the above.

It should be noted that continuity only considers failures due to unscheduled events, and so any periods of high HPL for example that have been previously informed via a NANU are not counted as a failure for continuity.

During the monitoring period of July 1 to September 30 2017 the following potential failure events were observed.

Start Date	Start Time	Outage Duration (secs)	Reason for Outage	Comments
23/08/17	19:00:20	8	No PL (<5 SVs)	Outage caused by sudden loss of measurements from obs file. Satellites appear at SLGO for the same period so it appears to be a local receiver problem.
07/09/17	14:04:54	3	Mixture of No PL (<5 SVs) and bad HPL (>556m)	Outage caused by sudden loss of measurements from obs file. Satellites appear at SLGO for the same period so it appears to be a local receiver problem.

Table 5-1: Summary of Outages from Monitoring Period

It can be seen that although there are two potential outages in this period, they are both short (<10 seconds) and both appear to be a local receiver issue. Therefore no failure events affecting continuity are applicable in this period and the continuity for this period is 100%.

## 6 AVAILABILITY

The availability in the monitoring period is computed as:

$$availability = \frac{MTBO}{MTBO + MTTR}$$

Where MTBO is the mean time between outage, which is computed as total time divided by number of outage events, and MTTR is the mean time to restore, which is computed as total outage time divided by number of outage events.

In the same way as for continuity analysis, outages are identified and used to compute the MTBO and MTTR figures. The difference in this case is that availability includes outages due to scheduled as well as unscheduled outages.

Based on the list of outages from Table 5-1 it can be seen that during this period there were no true system outages lasting for more than 10 seconds. Therefore the availability was 100%. This meets the availability requirements specified in section 2.2.

## 7 CONCLUSIONS

The GPS performance has been assessed against the ICAO requirements for the period of July to September 2017.

- Accuracy
  - Horizontal accuracy checked against threshold of 220m.
  - 95% horizontal accuracy <3m on each day.
  - One day with potential large errors (300m)
  - Accuracy requirement is passed although the potential large errors are unusual and exceed the threshold if instantaneous errors are taken into account.
- Integrity
  - Horizontal error checked against alert limit of 556m.
  - Maximum horizontal errors usually <4m, although one day with errors of 300m due to issue with PRN07
  - Integrity requirement is passed.
- Continuity
  - Results checked for outages (<5 satellites, position error > alert limit, protection level > alert limit).
  - Two potential outages identified, although they seem to be due to local/receiver errors and hence are not counted as an SIS outage.
  - Continuity is 100% and therefore requirement is met.
- Availability
  - Results checked for outages (<5 satellites, position error > alert limit, protection level > alert limit).
  - No applicable system outages identified.
  - Availability is 100% and therefore requirement is met.

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